Skip Pere caro y suredating main content. Log In Sign Up. Aspects of the Roman Experience in Iberia, B. Anejos de Hispania Antiqua IX.
Palmer of the University of Pennsylvania. It is a pleasure to acknowledge my deep gratitude for Professor Palmer's patient guidance and assistance; his thorough knowledge of Roman Republican history and historical methodology has saved me many an error. I also owe a special debt to Professors Erich S. Jenkins, and Margaret Thompson, who read all or part of this material in an earlier version and who offered many useful suggestions for improvements.
The original research in Spain and Germany was aided by A.
Koch, to whom I am also very grateful. Although my research would have been impossible without the aid and encouragement of these and many other people, the responsi- bility for the conclusions to be found in this study is, of course, entirely
Pere caro y suredating own. Appian Bella Hispanica, unless otherwise noted. Bad ian, PC E. III and IV I, Florence, 19,57, reprinted with corrections RE Paulys Realencyclopaedie der classischen Altertumswissen- schaft.
Stuttgart, to present. The initial struggle for dominance was long and hard fought; the peace and prosperity of the Empire provided rewards.
However, it is the early years of the Roman presence bJ. Iberia that is of concern here. It is to the broader aspects of the Ro- bztinarum. No treatment of the establishment of Roman sovereignty in Iberia can neglect completely military activities. But I have tried to put the individual Spanish campaigns in the perspective of the overall expan- sion of Roman control, and to show how diplomatic and geographical, S: Although the Romans patently did not become involved in the Spains with a system of complete conquest in mind, nevertheless, the exigencies of events caused their domination to proceed along presu- mably unconscious logical and methodical "Pere caro y suredating." In answer to this Rei Publicae.
Contact between the occupying forces and the native population could not be avoided, nor was there any attempt to avoid it. The enforced contact between Romans and natives, for all the positive results engendered, was a costly process for Rome in terms of the of the occupation, Pere caro y suredating, for the natives, in terms of the exactions legal and illegal which they were forced to pay to the Romans.
The image which emerges from a study of the early years of the Roman conquest is multifaceted. War, diplomacy, administration, Ro- mankation, exploitation - all. This treatment seeks to provide a synthetic view of these aspects of Roma-w activities in Iberia during the late third and second centuries B. A basic knowledge of the military history of the Roman conquest of Iberia has been assumed.
By no means all problems concerning the Spanish wars have been resolved, but this study did not seem the place to attempt to solve them.
Sutherland, in his Romans in Spain, offers a good summary of these wars for those not as yet familiar with their course. Unless otherwise noted, all dates are B. All citaJions from Appian are from his Bella Hispanica. When no footnote explains a prosopographical notice, consult Appendices I and II and, if necessary, T. Broughton, The Magistrates of the Roman Republic. Extensive reference to the ancient sources has been thought preferable to extensive citations of modern studies, where these studies Pere caro y suredating not add materially to an understanding of the notice alone.
The geogrtllfJhy of Iberia may be unfamiliar: Modern names have been substituted where it seemed necessary. In this chapter the conquest is described in terms of a logical expansion of control based upon warfare, garrisons, the encou- ragement of strategic native towns, and the establishment of military outpOsts.
As base areas were secured by these methods, continued friction with native tribes led to an ever widening sphere of domination based, in the south, on expansion to defensible geographical barriers, and,
Pere caro y suredating the north, on gaining control of more and more of the Celtiberian area by attacks from the Hiberus and coastal areas. In a discussion of military subjection, the role played by garrisons established by the conquering Romans is very important.
The placing of a garrison in a newly captured town was a key feature of the Roman conquest. During the first hundred years of Roman activity in Iberia the specific reports of garrisons are relatively few. This should not lead to the conclusion that the number of garrisons was therefore small. In almost all of the treaties of which there is there is the stipula- tion that a garrison is to be admitted to the captured town. The normal treatment of a captured community included such a garrison 1.
Al- though these garrisons might not remain perpetually, presumably Rome always kept the option of re-imposing them should the need arise 2. Thus, the following survey shoud be considered only as indicative of a larger series of unnamed garrisons.
The garrison left at Carthago Nova Pere caro y suredating is a typical example of Roman policy Livy Three years later Gades, the other stronghold of Carthage, surrendered to Rome.
An agreement was reached with L. Marcius, the representative of Rome Livy In or early inanother important garrison is mentioned at the Sucro river. Cornelius Scipio fell ill. The strategic value of the Sucro is obvious: How long this garrison remained is conjectural, but due to irs important position it probaby retained some troops but not as many as eight thousand at least until the foundation of Valentia abour 4.
Yet another strategic location was secured by a garrison in Junius Silanus and P. Cornelius Scipio took Castulo they left a garrison to secure the town Appian It can be supposed that it was a fairly strong post both from the military importance of the position of Castulo, and from the disloyalty of the towns in the region.
Again inafter Cornelius Scipio had left Tarraco for Rome, In- 3 Whether or nor there was a prefect at Gades depends on the interpre- tation of Livy Gaditanis item petentibus remiuum, ne praefectus Gades mitterentttr, adversus id quod iis in fidem popttU Romani venientibus cum L.
The nearly unanimous scholarly opinion has been that Gades was requesting that a prefect imposed contrary to the treary of be removed e.
Badian has, however, set the case straight. Livy, he contends, "makes it, clear that the 8 original treaty called for a prefecr, and notes that this would have been a normal stipulation in a "military convention" such
Pere caro y suredating Marc ius was empowered to arrange Foreign Clientelae B. Oxford, This prefect would have been in charge of a garrison, as was often the case in dealing with surren- dered towns.
For a more detailed discussion of the problem of the garrison at Gades, see Appendix VI.
For a discussion of prefects in general see G. Varius Severus Hibrida tr. Aemilius Scaurus records him as 'Hispan us' -either a cognomen or an ethnic Ascon.
Perhaps Varius' family sprang from a liaison between a Roman officer stationed at the camp near the Sucro probably at a town of the same name; cf.